Seeing Like an Authoritarian State by Ford, Cristie
Seeing Like an Authoritarian State
Cristie Ford 2019-06-19T09:30:20
The Social Credit System (SCS), as proposed in China, provokes an interesting
philosophical question. Can human behaviour be moulded to create a better, fairer
society by awarding ‘credit’ to those who behave in ways seen as positive by some
broad-based authority, in this case, the state? Is the SCS a promising idea for
developing a well-functioning society under conditions of complexity and diversity,
or is it a massive exercise in government control over virtually all aspects of citizens’
lives?
The SCS in China is not an abstract concept. If fully implemented, it would affect
over one billion human beings in a context marked by an increasingly authoritarian
and surveillance-obsessed government regime, extensive human rights abuses,
political persecutions, and tragic 20th-century history of state-sponsored citizen-on-
citizen violence. To be clear, the SCS is being proposed by the same government
that is currently detaining hundreds of thousands, perhaps a million, of its ethnic
minority citizens in ‘re-education camps’ beyond the reach of its legal system. 
Against this background, it is not ‘wrong’ to assess SCS ‘merely in relation to the
potentially nefarious tendencies of Xi Jinping’s administration’, as Wessel Reijers
suggests. On the contrary, it is analytically problematic and perhaps amoral to
proceed as if the SCS concept is a purely technocratic initiative that exists at some
metaphysical separation from the regime that spawned it. 
To be fair, we should be sceptical that any state is more interested in enhancing
genuine collective virtue than in the surveillance and control that make its
bureaucratic jobs easier. In Seeing Like a State, James C. Scott showed how
a state values ‘synoptic legibility’, or the ability to deeply see its citizens, for its
own purposes. Synoptic legibility makes it easier to tax people, conscript them,
track them, and punish them. Scott describes the ways in which the state – along
with other agents of ‘homogenisation, uniformity, grids, and heroic simplification’,
including capitalism – tend to flatten out lived reality into forms that are legible for
its purposes.1)Scott, J.C. (1998), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New York: Vail Ballou Press, p.8. It is
not a surprise that any state might see the promise in new data tools. 
At the same time, it is not a coincidence that an authoritarian regime is advancing
these particular, panoptic initiatives. The SCS is, at its root and in its purpose,
inextricably entwined with a totalising and pervasive state-driven project of
surveillance, homogenisation, and fear. 
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Should a State Try to Allocate Moral Deserts?
Respecting human dignity requires at least three things from the state: it requires
that the state not offend – at a minimum – basic individual human rights; it requires
the rule of law, when questions of individual rights and responsibilities intersect with
coercive state power; and it requires that the state not be utterly panoptic, so that
individuals have some scope for autonomy and privacy in their lives. President Xi’s
regime cannot be trusted to provide these things, but the problem with the SCS goes
deeper than that. 
For the sake of argument, let us imagine an SCS regime that respected at least the
most basic human and equality rights, and accorded citizens something resembling
the rule of law. What would this look like? 
First, the regime observes fundamental values around anti-discrimination; human
autonomy, dignity, and equality; and the ability to participate, through free speech
and freedom of association, in public life. Within the expansive SCS mandate, which
covers not just formal rights but also the ‘honest mentality’ (that is, presumably, the
virtue and morality, and perhaps thoughts and intentions) of individuals, equality and
anti-discrimination provisions would have to be understood in correspondingly broad
terms. So, even if divorce is considered morally wrong and punishable under SCS,
a woman divorcing her abusive-to-the-point-of-homicidal husband would be exempt
from punishment. She has done nothing ‘wrong’. Homeless people are not further
punished for sleeping under bridges, the old are not punished for failing to contribute
their labour, dissidents are not punished for speaking freely, and mental illness does
not algorithmically generate a worsening spiral of stigma and punishment. Being a
follower of a disfavoured religious tradition, or being gay or transgender, does not,
at a minimum, generate punishments that violate human rights. Republican thought,
which Reijers alludes to, would go further to impose an ethos of anti-domination
that does not simply prevent the state from punishing people for such personal and
social characteristics; it would affirmatively acknowledge them as essential to an
empowering and emancipatory conception of citizenship.2)See, e.g., Michelman, F.
(1988) ‘Law’s Republic’, 97 Yale LJ 1493-1537; Pettit, P. (1997), Republicanism: A
Theory of Freedom and Government. New York: Oxford University Press. But let us
go with minimum protections.
Second, the SCS’s doling out of ‘encouragements’ and ‘constraints’ would have
to be responsive to some plausible version of the rule of law, meaning that the
state is precluded from exercising power arbitrarily. Procedural safeguards and
meaningful appeal mechanisms are in place for citizens, and some mechanism
for state accountability is operating. For example, laws are administered by courts
in which the accused are entitled to procedural fairness and impartial judges give
reasons, which can be appealed, based on established methods of justification
and by reference to basic human rights and constitutional commitments. This too is
necessary if basic human rights are to be protected not only in theory, but also in
practice. 
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President Xi’s China will not meet the requirements above, and this is not a
coincidence. It is difficult to imagine President Xi’s SCS not discriminating against
minority religious groups, or political dissidents, or financially irresponsible, and we
cannot imagine people being accorded meaningful procedural fairness rights. SCS
is part and parcel of this regime’s priorities: a state that does not respect individual
human rights and does not provide procedural fairness is also the kind of state that
would conceive of a panoptic state-based regime for allocating moral deserts across
a broad swath of human action, thereby denying individuals scope for autonomy
and privacy in their lives. An open state that acknowledges diversity and perhaps
even contestation, and respects individuals’ ability to decide for themselves what
constitutes a good life, is not the kind of state that dreams up SCS. 
The State is Not the Market
Mathias Siems is correct in observing that whether SCS will be a ‘digital republic’
or a ‘digital dictatorship’ will depend on context, and he is correct in observing that
rating systems are proliferating in the West as well. These systems also generate
real risks, which we should be wary of.3)See, e.g., Baker, T. (2002). ‘Risk, Insurance,
and the Social Construction of Responsibility’ in: Baker, T. and Simon, J., eds.,
Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. It is also true that, as Jens van’t Klooster notes,
capitalist societies do not do well in ‘giving individuals what they morally deserve’.
Defined in that way, the market is clearly not ‘fair’. Yet these comparisons miss a
crucial point. 
We should not equate state-directed surveillance and rating systems with the
decentralised, partial, and often commerce-based rating systems being developed
in the West. It is not valid to compare the market – a private, fundamentally
decentralised system, which for all its considerable flaws no one yet has managed
to corner – with a centralised state apparatus, as mechanisms for allocating
‘moral deserts’. The market is not a mechanism for allocating moral deserts; it is a
mechanism for exchange. And the market exists in China too, where it is no more
‘fair’ than it is elsewhere. 
Wealth accretes across generations in the West, but it also accretes across
generations all over the world and across history, except when war, or revolution,
or large-scale tragedy disrupts the pattern.4)Piketty, T. & Goldhammer, A. (2014).
Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.
146-55. In this sense, SCS is not a ‘moral deserts’-based alternative that has much
chance of supplanting other structures for allocating power and rewards.
Learning from History
The West has some experience with state regimes, often associated with the
provision or withholding of social service benefits, which try to some degree to
allocate moral deserts. These have often disproportionately infringed on the dignity
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and privacy of the poor and marginalised,5)See, e.g., Bridges, K.M. (2011), ‘Privacy
Rights and Public Families’, 34 Harvard J.L. & Gender, 113-74. which suggests two
things: that across societies, state-based moral deserts mechanisms may be likely
to treat non-conforming or marginalised individuals and communities as objects of
contempt; and that it is a good thing that the people, who hand out social service
benefits while asking invasive questions about a person’s personal life, do not have
more power and information than they do. But these are small potatoes. Other
parts of the world, and China above all, have had more extensive and far more
painful experience with virtue testing. The ideological purity tests and corresponding
confessions, purges, and mass violence that characterised the Cultural Revolution
are hardly two generations behind us.
In our post-Foucaultian, decentralised, financialised world, it may seem old-
fashioned to focus on the state as a primary agent of oppression. It is provocative
and intellectually interesting to equate Chinese state action with market action under
capitalism. But presumably, we can learn something from those mid-20th-century
Western communists who favourably compared Soviet communism to liberalism well
through Stalin’s regime, ignoring its brutal reality in favour of intellectual engagement
with its possibility under Marxist theory.6)Judt, T. (2003). ‘The Last Romantic’.
The New York Review of Books, 20 November 2003 (reviewing Eric Hobsbawm,
Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life). Engaging with theory while ignoring
context is itself a moral choice. We should not be blind to authoritarianism because it
is clothed in the rhetoric of civic virtue and progress. 
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